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Abstract
The development of non-dispatchable renewable sources of energy requires more flexible
reliable thermal equipment to match residual demand. We analyze the advantages of
delaying production decisions to benefit from more precise information on states of the
world, at the expense of higher production costs in a two-period framework where two
technologies with different flexibility characteristics are available. We determine first-
best production levels ex ante and ex post, that is, when demand is still random and
is known with certainty respectively. We then show that, under perfect competition,
first best can be implemented indifferently either by means of ex post state-contingent
markets or by means of a day-ahead market followed by adjustment markets. By
contrast, when the industry is imperfectly competitive, the two market designs are not
equivalent.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Flexibility in electricity production
In most industries, production processes are at their highest productivity when
they are steady, that is, when inputs and outputs are almost invariant in time.
By contrast, starting a production process involves warming up periods, changing
speed requires ramping up and down costly procedures, and stopping cannot be
instantaneous without damages. These unsteady periods are costly but they
generally do not occur very often because both the inputs and the outputs can
be stored. Then the flexibility of the production process, that is, its capacity to
become efficient at different speed levels within a short lag, is not critical. This
is not true in the electricity industry because energy storage is not feasible at
large scale and any gap between production and demand (the latter being weakly
responsive to scarcity signals) provokes costly damages. Moreover, the need for
reliable flexible production is increasing with the development of non-dispatchable
renewable sources. With operating costs close to zero, electricity made from solar
and wind energy is given priority in the merit order for dispatching, but this
energy depends on states of nature. Therefore, it is not fully reliable and must
be backed by energy from hydro or thermal plants ready to produce in real time
above or below the planned level, to compensate for variations in the observed
output of green energy.
Overall, the electricity industry is characterized by constant changes in the
level of required production, with the consequence that flexibility of reliable equip-
ment is a highly valuable quality for the whole system. Since the opening up to
market mechanisms, most countries have accommodated flexibility requirements
by designing a two-layer system for energy transactions:
• most transactions1 are settled in a day-ahead framework where each of the
24 hours of the next day is a market. Typically, there is a deadline (say
12:00) for the submission of demand and supply bids for power that will
be delivered the following day. A computer system (a surrogate for the
Walras auctioneer) calculates the hourly prices that balance supply and
demand. Later (say at 1.00 pm) these equilibrium prices are made public
and operations are settled. The next day, power is provided hour for hour
according to the agreed contracts.
• in balancing markets, buyers and sellers can trade power close to real time
to re-balance demand and supply if something wrong has occurred since the
corresponding day-ahead clearing. Balancing markets typically are contin-
uous markets where prices are set based on a pay-as-bid basis, instead of
the unique hourly price of the day-ahead system.
1We mean ”most transactions in the wholesale markets”. Actually, the largest portion of
electricity transactions is fixed by contract.
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Clearly, participating in balancing trade requires more flexible equipment than
participating in day-ahead.
1.2 Flexibility degrees
In the electricity industry, recent interest in flexibility problems is due to the
challenging development of non-dispatchable renewable energy, mainly solar and
wind (see e.g. Bertsch et al., 2012). Flexibility means the ability of a system ”to
accommodate increasing levels of uncertainty while maintaining satisfactory levels
of performance at minimal additional cost for any timescale” (Silva, 2010). On
practical grounds, most of the analysts consider two groups of technologies among
conventional thermal sources, depending on whether or not the output of a source
can be ramped up or down at short notice. In this binary classification, there is a
clear separation between inflexible nuclear and coal-fired plants on the one hand,
and flexible natural gas turbines on the other hand (see for example Eisenack,
2015; Ko¨k et al. 2016)2. The output from inflexible technologies must be planned
before knowing the real state of demand and production from renewables. The
adjustment is made ex post by dispatching the flexible gas turbines in real time.
It results that the historically dominant inflexible technologies are now challenged
by the pair ”renewables + flexible turbines” and face the risk of being pushed
out of the energy mix.
Actually, nuclear and coal-fired plants are not as inflexible as stated in the
quoted papers. Lykidi and Gourdel (2015) for example recognize the flexibility of
nuclear plants at least in so far as they accommodate the seasonal component of
demand. But seasonal flexibility is just one part of the flexibility problem. Data
published on line clearly show that all thermal plants have as some hourly flexibil-
ity, less than hydroelectric installations, but sufficient to deserve some attention.3
In particular, existing thermal power plants can provide more flexibility than is
often assumed. Coal fired power plants are already providing large operational
flexibility: ”they are adjusting their output on a 15-minute basis (intraday mar-
ket) and even on a 5-minute basis (balancing market) to variation in renewable
generation and demand” (Pescia 2017).
However, it remains true that for real-time adjustment, in particular for bal-
ancing the variability of wind, most systems rely mainly on gas-fired power tur-
bines on top of demand response, pump storage and energy trade with neighboring
countries. Some researchers also insist on the need for improving the real-time
market design to be sure that thermal plants needed to back up renewables will
survive the massive entry of non-dispatchable sources (Ma et al., 2013; Finon,
2As stated in PJM (2017) ”Inflexible units are those with declining average costs that are
unable to economically produce power within a certain range, or that require an economic mini-
mum output. Inflexible units can be of all fuel types, including coal, nuclear and large gas units,
which are inflexible based on either their technology or the way they purchase natural gas.”
3See for example the charts proposed by http://www.rte-france.com/en/eco2mix/eco2mix-
mix-energetique-en for the French system.
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2015; Bertsch et al., 2016). Finally, note that European regulators (ACER and
CEER, 2017) want to favor a so-called ”holistic approach” to support market
flexibility. They would like the whole electric system to be involved, including all
consumers, who should have the opportunity to participate in all relevant markets
and other arrangements for valuing flexibility, in particular through aggregation
by independent operators. The regulators quote changes in how energy is con-
sumed, e.g. electric vehicles, combined with electricity storage, home automation
and progress in Information and Communication Technologies ICT), which may
facilitate the provision of flexibility from new sources. From this view, flexibility
platforms are to be operated close to consumers, with a pivotal role devoted to
distribution system operators.
We rather favour an analytical approach to study the potential flexibility of
large plants that already participate in wholesale markets. We mainly have in
mind generators using gas, coal, water from reservoirs, or nuclear energy. We
assume that every type of production plant has some flexibility potential and we
analyze how to combine several installations in an efficient way. We mainly focus
on first best and perfect competition outcomes. However, we also address the
question of flexibility under imperfect competition.
1.3 Outline of the paper
In section 2 we first recall that most economic models of investment and opera-
tion of the electric industry emphasize the production capacity constraint. They
therefore consider production plants as fully upward inflexible and fully down-
ward flexible. We then explain how the timing dimension of flexibility can be
modeled in a two-period framework where information on the state of the world
improves as time passes by, but production costs increase when production de-
cisions must become effective within a short lag. In section 3 we determine the
first-best allocation of production in this two-period setting and we show that,
under perfect competition, it can be implemented by either a day-ahead market,
followed by a state-dependent adjustment market, or only ex post markets. In
section 4, we illustrate the trade-off between information gain and adjustment
cost by using a multilinear cost function and a quadratic surplus function. We
then consider a duopoly model of competition in quantities (section 5) and show
that, contrary to perfect competition, market design matters. We conclude in
section 6.
2 Tools for the analysis of flexibility
As noted in subsection 2.1, in standard economic analysis of electricity produc-
tion there is little room for upward flexibility at the level of individual equipment.
The overall system is made flexible by stacking heterogeneous technologies char-
acterized by their installation and operation costs. In this approach, time appears
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Figure 1: Partially flexible equipment
in the form of use duration, a key determinant for the choice of equipment. Actu-
ally, time should also be taken into account in terms of the lag between decision
and execution, in particular when information on the state of demand and inter-
mittent renewable output become more precise. We emphasize this in subsection
2.2 to underline the importance of information in the decision process.
2.1 Quantity and price adjustments
2.1.1 Production limitations
Isolated plant The standard modeling of electricity production is based on
the hypothesis that, after installing capacity  at unit cost , energy  can be
produced at unit cost , as long as it remains below capacity. The cost function is
then () = + ,  ≤  This means that production is totally inflexible
beyond  and perfectly downward flexible. To model downward inflexibility,
one can add a constraint  ≥  with  between 0 and 1. If  = 0, the
plant is fully downward flexible; if  = 1, it can work only at level . As
shown in Figure 1, this elementary approach explains some essential features of
electricity production. We have represented different levels of marginal surplus,
that is, the derivative of the consumer’s surplus ( ) from the consumption of
 when nature is in state . We assume that, in each state  the function  is
a continuously differentiable concave function of , increasing up to a saturation
point and then decreasing The resulting marginal surplus  0( ) = ( )
is decreasing in  and becomes negative when consumption is large.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal (and competitive-equilibrium) short-run dis-
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patching of a given capacity  when , then marginal surplus (= demand)
0( ) takes different values.
) For medium values of demand (in the neighborhood of 3), production is
flexible so that market balancing is done by quantity adjustment. The competitive
price is just equal to the unit operation cost .
) For high values of demand (in the neighborhood of 4), production is
inflexible. Market balancing results from price increases above the unit operation
cost (or, if prices cannot increase, from demand rationing). The margin 0( )−
  0 contributes to the payment of capacity cost .
) For low values of demand (in the neighborhood of 2), production is in-
flexible. Market balancing results from price decreases below the unit opera-
tion cost (or, if prices cannot decrease, from supply rationing). The margin loss
 0( )−   0 impairs the recovery of capacity cost .
) For very low values of demand (in the neighborhood of 1), production
is also downward inflexible. Market balancing results in negative prices, i.e. the
producer is ready to pay consumers to get rid of excess production.
The combination of ) and ) is the basis of the so-called peak-load pricing
theory: the costs of inflexible capacity must be billed to consumers only in states
of nature where the capacity constraint is binding (Boiteux, 1949). The recog-
nition of cases ) and ) is more recent in the economic literature on energy
markets. It is mainly motivated by the development of solar and wind energy
that lowers residual demand to thermal producers and some states of nature. (see
e.g. Nicolosi, 2010)
Merit order Overall, the inflexibility of individual plants is alleviated by stack-
ing heterogeneous plants that differ in terms of installation and production costs.
Let  denote the cost of producing 1MWh and  the yearly cost of installing
and maintaining 1MW with technology . Then providing 1MW of power dur-
ing  hours costs  +  per year It results that the choice between two types
of equipment, say 1 and 2 with 2  1 and 2  1, depends on the expected
working duration:
2 + 2 ≷ 1 + 1 ⇐⇒  ≷ 1 − 22 − 1
For base demand, all along the 8760 hours of the year (minus the periods of
maintenance), the least-cost choice is technology 1, the one with high capacity
cost 1 and low operation cost 1. Technology 2 will be preferred for low duration
demand. Given the demand levels expected throughout the year, one can order
demands starting from the highest requested capacity to obtain the so-called
load-duration curve, a curve that shows how long demand will be below a given
capacity level. Then one can adapt investment in 1 and 2 to meet these
demand requirements. After the installation is done, capacity costs are sunk.
Then, only operation cost matters. It results that, when demand is low (  1),
only plant 1 is dispatched since 1  2. When   1 being constrained by
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the upward inflexibility of equipment 1, the dispatcher calls type 2 plants to
complement the supply from 1 Then, as long as 1    1 +2 demand
can be supplied by the full capacity of plant 1 and the flexible production −1
from plant 2 at the operating cost 2. This is the merit order, that is, the staircase
supply function that gives some flexibility to the entire electric system.4 In the
same vein, the interconnections provide some flexibility since the dispatcher can
rely on heterogeneous technologies located in adjacent regions (Bistline, 2017).
Ramping rates The above reference cases contrast capacity and production.
Actually, inflexibility is also a matter of variation in production in a given pe-
riod of time. Denoting by  the quantity produced at date , the producer is
constrained by
−∆ ≤ + −  ≤ ∆
where ∆ and ∆ are the maximum variations in production that are sustainable
between dates  and  +  upwards and downwards respectively. Production is
dynamically constrained to remain within a tunnel, the size of which increases
with time lapse .
Flexibility costs All the cases where inflexibility is characterized by physical
constraints, like the ones considered in the former subsections, represent engi-
neers’ concerns. This does not mean that this modeling does not include a refer-
ence to cost. Actually, the cost dimension appears as the dual variable associated
to each physical constraint when the dispatching program is launched. However,
it remains true that on pure engineering grounds, costs do not matter very much.
Physical performance is the main concern.5
By contrast, in the following sections, we consider explicit differences in cost
levels depending on the time lapse separating decision and operation, namely the
difference in costs when production must be planned before the state of (residual)
demand is known and when decision can be delayed until the revelation time of
demand level.
2.2 Ex ante and ex post decisions
Changing the level of production can be done at different speeds, then at different
costs. From now on we focus on the cost feature of flexibility. We do not use
a continuous time model where the adaptation duration would be endogenous.
Instead we rely on a two period model where production can be dispatched among
4See for example the Aggregated Curves in the Market Results at
https://www.apxgroup.com//.
5Similarly, there is no reference to cost minimization in the following quotation of the Eu-
ropean energy regulators: ”Flexibility can be defined as the ability of the electricity system to
respond to fluctuations of supply and demand while, at the same time, maintaining system
reliability” (ACER and CEER, 2017).
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the periods at different costs. The two periods are distinct by the information
on the surplus function, then on demand. In period 1 (ex ante), demand is still
random. In period 2 (ex post), the decision maker has perfect information on the
surplus function. We keep the notation ( ) to represent the surplus derived
from the consumption of  when the state of nature is  and 0( ) for marginal
utility, that is, the derivative of ( ) with respect to its first argument.
We begin by assuming that the cost function is the same in the two periods.
This is a critical assumption that we relax later.
2.2.1 Gains from delaying decisions
Let () be the cost of producing  ≥ 0, whatever the period. This is an
increasing, convex and continuously differentiable function. The surplus function
( ) has the same property as before. Additionally, we assume 0(0 )   0(0)
for all , so that production is always profitable. The random variable  is
distributed according to a continuous density  on a compact interval [ ].
• If  is to be chosen before knowing the realized value of , the problem to
solve is
Max≥0  [( )− ()]  (1)
The ex ante solution is then the value b that solves  (0( )) =  0() hence
the expected performance  =  [(b )− (b)] 
• If the decision maker can wait until the state of nature is revealed, the
problem is, in each state  :
Max≥0 ( )− () (2)
The ex post solution is the function  () that solves 0( ) =  0() hence an
expected performance  =  [( ()  )− ( ())] 
Since the expectation of a supremum is at least the supremum of the expec-
tations, we have that
   (3)
The intuition is that ex post the decision maker has more accurate information
on the state of demand (or technology, or regulation, etc.) than ex ante. He/she
will therefore make a more appropriate decision for the circumstances, and the
performance will consequently be better.6 Whenever it is possible, the producer
isolated from strategic considerations is better off by delaying decisions until the
very last minute.7
6Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) were the first authors to provide an analytical treatment
of the advantages for firms of delaying decisions.
7The gains from flexibility are emphasized by Goutte and Vassilopoulos (2017). They dis-
tinguish between the ”immediacy” value as the urgency of the delivery increases (this value is
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Figure 2: Costs of planned and adjusted production
2.2.2 Costs from delaying decisions
Actually the cost for doing so is different from the cost incurred when planning in
advance. This is the essence of flexibility: taking advantage of better information
at the expense of higher production costs. If we assume that the production
necessary to satisfy demand  can be partly planned ex ante (denoted by ) and
partly produced ex post (denoted by ), we can write the cost function as ( )
with  +  =  and ( 0)  (0 ) ∀ In Figure 2 we have plotted a curve
( 0) representing the low cost of producing ”at regular speed” and a curve
( b ) representing the cost of adding to or removing from b the adjustment 
In this more realistic framework, the decision maker solves:
Max 
µ
max (+  )− ( )
¶
 (4)
Ex post, knowing  and , the entrepreneur determines ( ) like in (2), ex-
cept that a volume  is already available. Ex ante, anticipating this adjustment,
he decides upon  like in (1) We then face a trade-off between the informational
advantages of a delayed decision and the extra costs due to unplanned adjust-
ment. As shown in the following, it results that with   0 and  6= 0, the
performance is generically higher than if either  = 0 or  = 0.
revealed during the intraday process and is closely linked to risk) from the ”flexibility” as a
resource can capture variations of shorter granularity (more related to asset optimization and
already priced a day ahead).
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3 Optimal planning and optimal adjustment
In this section, we analyze the trade-off between information gain and adjustment
cost in a general framework. We successively determine the first-best allocation
and the competition allocation under two market designs: first when there are
both day-ahead and adjustment markets, then when there are only adjustment
markets.
3.1 First best
We assume a non-specified surplus function (+ ) continuously differentiable
concave in each state  and a non-specified cost function ( ) continuously
differentiable convex. The problem to solve is (4)  We solve it backwards.
• Maximizing the net surplus in state , the first order condition is
0(+  ) =  0( ) (5)
with  0 = ( )  0. From (5) we obtain the optimal adjustment( ). Differentiating the condition, we have that
( )
 =
” − ”
” − ”
where ” = 2( )2  0 and ” = 2( )2  0 Then the
denominator is positive. If the cross second derivative ” is nil or positive (or
negative but small in absolute value) then   0 Indeed, when  necessitates
an upward (downward) adjustment, the adjustment will be small (large) if  has
been fixed at a large value.
• Ex-ante, the problem to solve is
max  ( ( ); )
where  ( ; ) = (+  )− ( ).
Given the anticipated ex post adjustments (5), the first order condition that
determines the optimal planned output ∗ and the resulting optimal adjustment
in each state of nature (∗ ) is

h
 0(∗ + (∗ ) )−  0(∗ (∗ ))
i
= 0 (6)
where 0 and  0 denote partial derivatives wrt .
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3.2 Perfect competition
We now analyze how first best can be implemented by market mechanisms. In
this section, we consider competitive markets were all agents are price-takers.
Consumers are supposed to be price reactive, either directly or through retailers
and energy service providers.
3.2.1 Day-ahead and adjustment markets
The standard organization for electricity trade in liberalized economies is a set
of two successive markets: ) a day-ahead market where competitive producers
and consumers trade quantity  at price  , followed by ) a balancing market
(given state of nature ) where they trade quantity  at price .
• In the adjustment market determined by , the supply function is the solu-
tion to max −( ) and demand is the solution to max (+ )−
. From the first order conditions  0(+ )− = 0 and  0( )− = 0,
we have the inverse demand function ( ) =  0(+  ) and the in-
verse supply function () =  0( ) respectively.
Matching demand and supply,
( ) = () =⇒  0(+  ) =  0( ) (7)
we obtain the equilibrium quantity ( ) and price ( )
• In the day-ahead market, demand is the solution to
max  [ (+  ( )  )− ( ) ( )]−  (8)
where ( ) ≡ 0 since consumers are price-takers and  0(+ ( )  )−
 ( ) = 0 by the anticipated behavior on the adjustment market. Conse-
quently, from the first order condition we obtain the inverse demand func-
tion
 () = 
³
0(+  ( )  )
´
 (9)
Producers solve
max +  [( ) ( )−  (  ( ))] (10)
 Again, ( ) ≡ 0 since they are price-takers and  0( )−  ( ) = 0
by the ex post adjustment. Consequently, the inverse supply funtion is
 () = 
³
 0 (  ( )))
´
 (11)
The result is the day-ahead equilibrium  () =  () =⇒  ¡0(+  ( )  )¢ =
 ¡ 0 (  ( )))¢  which is the same relationship as (6).
We then conclude the following:
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Proposition 3.1. A market framework made up of a day-ahead competitive mar-
ket followed by a competitive adjustment market contingent to the observed state
of nature allows one to decentralize first best.
Note that this requires that consumers, or the intermediaries who represent
them, be allowed to sell contracted energy on the adjustment market. For low
values of , the adjustment  can be negative, so that the actual consumption
+  is lower than the planned consumption . Then the market mechanism is
efficient only if flexibility also comes from demand response.8
3.2.2 No day-ahead energy market
In all countries where the two-stage architecture we have just analyzed has been
set up, most energy is traded in the day-ahead market.9 What if there were only
ex post (state contingent) markets,10 i.e. if all quantities, whether planned or
adjusted, were sold at the same contingent price?
Ex-post, consumers solve max ( ) − . Then the demand function in
state  is (+ ) =  0(+ ) Producers solve max ×(+)− ( ),
from which we derive the supply function (+ ) =  0( ). At equilibrium,
( + ) = ( + ) =⇒  0( ) =  0(+  ) (12)
determines the quantity and price equilibrium  ( ),  ( ) 
At the ex ante stage there is no trade. Only competitive producers have to
determine the output  to maximize their expected profit
max  [( )(+  ( ))−  (  ( ))]
with ( ) ≡ 0 since they are price takers. From the first order condition
and using the ex post adjustment condition, the ex ante production plan is the
solution to

h
( )−  0(  ( ))
i
= 0 (13)
Now, observe that at ex post equilibrium in state , we have  0(+ ( )  ) =
( ) Combining this with (13)  we obtain the same condition as (6) 
We then conclude the following:
Proposition 3.2. Under perfect competition, first best can be reached with ex
post state-contingent markets and no day-ahead market. Even though producers
are only partially flexible, the day-ahead market is not necessary.
8On demand response, see Crampes and Le´autier (2012).
9Actually, the largest fraction is traded through bilateral contracts. Here, we refer only to
energy traded in a pool.
10We do not consider the case where only day-ahead trade is organized and there is no
exchange for ex post adjustement. That would entail energy outage or energy waste depending
on the ex post demand value.
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We can explain this result as follows. When there is a day-ahead market, the
demand function used for planned production (9) is based on the expectation of
ex post prices. Then in the only-expost market scenario firms sell zero kWh ex
ante but determine their output targeting the expectation of ex post prices while
when day-ahead trade is possible, producers do sell their ex ante production at
a price equal to the expectation of ex post prices. Consequently, their expected
profits are the same in the two scenarios, which entails that they take the same
decisions. This also explains why, in the two-market scenario, consumers buy on
the day-ahead market whereas they could wait until the state of nature is revealed.
Since they can resell excess contracted quantity (a crucial hypothesis), with an ex
ante equilibrium price equal to the expectation of the ex post equilibrium prices
they are indifferent between buying ex ante or ex post. The equality between the
ex ante price and the expectation of ex post prices plays the role of a no-arbitrage
condition.
With an ex post market for each state of nature, the day-ahead market is
redundant to implement first best. Then, why do day-ahead markets exist in
energy exchanges such as epexspot?11 Several reasons can be mentionned: for
example the lack of ex post markets in actual design, last-minute transaction
costs, the time required to match demand and supply in uniform-price auctions,
the time to check that the dispatching is feasible given the grid constraints, and
the lack of demand-response. Maybe more important is agents’ risk aversion. In
our model, both the producer and the consumer are risk neutral. That is obvious
for the producer as it maximizes its expected profit. The consumer maximizes
their expected net surplus which is measured in monetary terms. With such a
quasi-linearity structure, the model fails to bring out the reluctance of agents to
risky outcomes, then the attractiveness of day-ahead transactions.
4 Linear specification
To illustrate the flexibility problem, we use a multilinear cost function and a
quadratic surplus function. After a presentation of the notations and properties
of the model, in subsection 4.2 we determine the optimal dispatching and in
subsection 4.3 we consider the specific case of a uniform distribution of the de-
mand parameter. Finally, in subsection 4.4 we address the case of heterogeneous
technologies.
11See https://www.epexspot.com/en/
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4.1 Cost and surplus
4.1.1 Cost function
Assume that the total cost for producing +  ≥ 0 is given by:
( ) =
½ +  if  ≥ 0
 if  ≤ 0 
where  ≥ 0 is to be chosen ex ante and the decision on  can be delayed.12 The
parameters satisfy  ≥   0 This is a particular case of the curves in Figure 2,
with a linear cost of planned production, ( 0) =  a linear cost of adjusted
production ( b ) =  b +  on the right of b and an horizontal line on the
left of b. Note that in this simplified modeling the adjustment cost has the same
shape whatever the value of the planned production since 2 ≡ 0
The above cost function means that all planned costs are sunk: there is no
gain from decreasing production below the planned volume. This modeling is
similar to that of Dixit (1980). However the Dixit’s model is an approach of entry
deterrence by an incumbent firm that invests in sunk capacity before producing
and selling on a deterministic market.
The asymmetry between costly upward and free downward adjustments is a
useful simplifying hypothesis when the objective is just to illustrate the general
results of the former sections. Actually, thermal plants can save at least on
fuel and emission permits when producing below the planned level. In this first
approach, we want to emphasize the cost of increasing production in the very short
term since the main fear of private and public decision-makers in the electricity
industry remains the risk of black-outs. As noted in subsection 2.1, downward
inflexibility is becoming a new concern because of the development of non-reliable
renewables.
The cost function ( ) is convex in . If  ≥ 0, we have ( )− (+
 0) = (− ) ≥ 0, which is the extra cost for producing +  after planning
only . Similarly if  ≤ 0, we have ( ) − ( +  0) = − ≥ 0, which is
the extra cost for producing + after planning , instead of producing directly
+  ≤  in the first stage.
4.1.2 Maximum and minimum net surplus
Assume that the gross surplus from consuming  in state  is given by :
( ) = ( − 
2
)
12Because we focus on short-term and very short-term decisions, we discard the capacity
constraints and costs. These costs are partially financed through capacity mechanisms. For an
analysis of the complex relationship between markets for energy, availability and flexibility on
the one hand, and capacity mechanisms on the other hand, see Ho¨schle et al. (2017).
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where  is distributed according to the c.d.f.  () with a continuous density
() on the interval [ ], where we assume  ≥  (so that, for each  ≥ ,
0(0 ) =  ≥  ≥  =  0(0 )).
If it was possible to wait until the realization of the event to decide on pro-
duction, since  ≥  it would be optimal to set  = 0 and to choose  so as to
maximize (−
2
)− , which gives the state-contingent output  = − The
expected performance would be the maximum maximorum  = 1
2
 ( − )2.
By contrast, if all production had to be chosen ex ante, production would be based
on the expected value (). With the non-contingent output  = () − 
and no ex-post adjustment  = 0 we would obtain a low performance equal to
 = 1
2
(() − )2 Given (3), the actual performance  ∗ that is the value of
 when we solve (4)  will be between these two extreme values:
1
2
(()− )2 ≤ ∗ ≤ 1
2
( − )2
Notice that  (−)2 =  (−()+()−)2 = (−())2+(()− )2.
Consequently the gap 1
2
( − )2 − 1
2
(() − )2 = 1
2
( − ())2 (which
equals half the variance of ) is independent of . Then the larger the demand
uncertainty, measured by its variance, the higher the potential benefit from a
technology that allows ex-post adjustment.
4.2 Optimal dispatching
4.2.1 Adjustment
Given the quantity planned at stage 1, for each realization  of demand observed
at stage 2, the adjusted production  should be set so as to maximize ( ; ) =
(+  )− ( ) Since  ( ; ) is concave in  the first order condition
is sufficient to determine the unique solution.
• For   0, we have  ( ; )) = ( − +
2
)(+ )− − . Therefore:
 0(; ) ≥ 0⇐⇒  ≤  − (+ )
• For   0, we have  ( ; ) = ( − +
2
)(+ )− . Therefore:
 0(; ) ≥ 0⇐⇒  ≤  −
Consequently, if    + , the expost surplus  ( ; )) is uniquely max-
imized for  =  − (+ ). If   ,  ( ; ) is uniquely maximized for
 =  −. And if  ∈ [ +], the ex-post surplus is uniquely maximized for
 = 0. We then obtain:
Lemma 4.1. Optimal adjustment:
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Figure 3: Unit costs and demand span
If   , the optimal adjustment is  = −  0, and  ( ) = 1
2
2−
If  ∈ [ +], no adjustment is needed:  = 0, and ( ) = (−−
2
)
If    + , the optimal adjustment is  =  − −   0, and  ( ) =
1
2
( − )2 + (− )
These adjustments are shown in Figure 3, where 0( ) =  −  is the
marginal surplus in state  In particular for  ∈ [  − ], if  is at the lower
bound of the support ( = ) there is a downward adjustment  =  −   0
whereas if it is at its higher bound ( = ), there is an upward adjustment
 = (− )−  0. For ’medium’ values such as 1 and 2 the marginal surplus
at  is 0   −   so that no adjustment is profitable.
4.2.2 Planned production
Using the optimal adjustment rule of Lemma 41, problem (4) consists in Max≥0 ()
with:
 () = −+
Z 

2
2
 ()+
Z +

∙

µ
 − 
2
¶¸
 ()+
Z 
+
∙
+ ( − )
2
2
¸
 ()
(14)
where the three integrals correspond, in sequence, to   0  = 0 and   0.
• Note first that if we set    − , all adjustment must be upwards and
the welfare function reduces to  () = − + R  h+ (−)22 i  () 
Consequently,  0() =  −   0, which means that  has to be set at
least equal to − .
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The simple case where  =  results in  0() = 0 for all  ≤  − 
Setting  ≤  −  and adapting at the second stage up to  −  gives the best
possible social benefit = 1
2
 (( − )2)  This is because increasing production
a posteriori costs no more than if planned from scratch. Since initial costs are
sunk, it is optimal to choose in the first stage any output level no larger than to
the lowest value of demand −  and later to systematically adapt production
upwards
• Symmetrically, fixing    cannot be optimal since it would give  () =
− + R  22  (), and then  0() = −  0. Consequently  must be
set at most equal to  to avoid wasteful downwards adjustment.
• Then  () is given by (14). Its first derivative with respect to  is
 0() = −+
Z +

( −)  () + 
Z 
+
 ()  (15)
A slight increase in  costs . It has no effect on the gains corresponding
to low values of  since  is already two large in the corresponding states
of demand. By contrast, it has the benefit of decreasing the set of events
where a costly upward adjustment will be necessary to match demand, as
shown by the last term on the right-hand side in (15). For intermediary
levels of demand (such as those characterized by 1 and 2 in Figure 3)
the gains represented by the second term in the right-hand side of (15) are
the marginal surpluses provided at zero additional cost thanks to a larger
planned production.
The optimal production is then the solution to 0() = 0. The explicit value
of  is obviously dependent in the shape of the c.d.f of the demand parameter .
In the following, we consider the case of a uniform distribution.
4.3 Uniform distribution of the demand parameter
The explicit solution to  0() = 0 (where 0() is given by (15)) is determined
by the shape of the distribution function  (). To obtain a better understanding
of the flexibility effect, assume now that  follows a uniform distribution function
with density  = (− )−1 1[], so that  () =  We also assume that:
 −   . The adjustment rules of Lemma 4.1 obviously remain unchanged.
Given these rules, the solution to max () for  ≥ 0 is given by Proposition
4.2. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.2. The function  is concave and continuously differentiable. It
has a unique maximizer ∗.
Fixing ,  and the mean 1
2
(+ ), the maximum  (∗) is increasing in the
difference −  (or equivalently in the variance of ).
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There are three possible regimes for the optimal first stage production ∗ and
the achieved maximum:
A) If  ≥ 
³
1− 
2(−)
´

∗ = − +p2(− )(− ) ∈ [−  ]
 ∗ = 2
3
(−)p2(− )(− )+(−)(−)+1
6
(2++2+32(−)−3(+))
B) If 2
2(−) ≤  ≤ 
³
1− 
2(−)
´
,
∗ = − 1
2
−  (− ) ∈ [ − ]
 ∗ = 
2
2(− )− +
1
2
+ 
3 − 3
6(− ) −
3
24(− ) 
C) If  ≤ 2
2(−) ,
∗ = −p2(− ) ∈ [−  ]
 ∗ = −+ 2
√
2
3
32p(− ) + 3 − 3
6(− ) 
Notice that when  ≤ 2, case C) is not possible. So we are left with two
possible regimes: ) and ).
Proposition 4.2 can be interpreted as follows. Fix ,  and  such that
 −   . Then let  go from  to 0 so that it becomes more and more costly
to adapt production upwards compared to the cost of phase 1. In regime )
where  ≥ 
³
1− 
2(−)
´
, we obtain  ∈ [ −  ] Regime ) occurs when
2
2(−) ≤  ≤ 
³
1− 
2(−)
´
so that  ∈ [ − ] Finally, regime ) occurs when
 ≤ 2
2(−) , and production is  ∈ [− ] Overall, we see that when  decreases,
the planned production  increases as it becomes less profitable to adapt ex post
production upwards.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.1 is the following.
Corollary 4.3. Given the optimal first stage production ∗, the optimal adjust-
ment is
∗() =  −∗  0 if   ∗. This only happens in regimes ) and ).
∗() = 0 if  ∈ [∗ +∗] . This may happen in all regimes ), ), ).
∗() =  − −∗  0 if    +∗. This only happens in regimes ) and
).
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In zone ),  is close to  It is therefore profitable to fix a low  during the
first stage and a high   0 during the second, rather than a higher  at high
cost  and an adjustment  that may be negative. By contrast, in zone ),  is
so small that it is optimal to produce most of the output during the first stage.
As shown in section 3.2, perfect competition allows one to implement the
outcome of Proposition 4.2 and its corollary. With the current specification,
adjustment prices are ∗() =  when ∗()  0 ∗() = 0 when ∗()  0 and
∗() = −∗ when ∗() = 0 The ex ante price (if there is a day-ahead market)
is the weighted sum of these ex post prices. Regarding the fact that  (∗) is
increasing with the variance of , it is the consequence of the risk neutrality of
all agents.13
4.4 Heterogeneous technologies
In all electricity markets, heterogeneous technologies coexist, in particular be-
cause they have different degrees of flexibility. Ma et al (2013) consider the pro-
vision of flexibility using a portfolio of generating units with different dynamic
characteristics. Their model analyzes the balancing of short term (operation)
costs and long term (building) costs of flexibility provision. By contrast we keep
on thinking in terms of day-ahead and real-time dispatching, neglecting capacity
costs that are already sunk.
Assume there are two technologies ( = 1 2) with costs
( ) =
½ +  if  ≥ 0
 if  ≤ 0 (16)
where 1  2  2  1
Clearly, by 2  1, it is sub-optimal to dispatch technology 2 for the planned
production, and, by 1  2, to use technology 1 for the adjustment production.
Therefore the first-best solution is the same as with a single technology charac-
terized by costs 2 for basic production and 1 for upward adjustment.
The only interplay between the two technologies is that a higher 2 pushes the
use of technology 1 at the initial stage up and, with a higher 1 one can expect
a more intensive use of technology 2 at the adjustment stage. Clearly, the result
is the same under perfect competition. Only producers endowed with technology
1 start their production day-ahead and only those endowed with technology 2
participate in the real-time market if upward adjustment is required.
A mix of technologies at both stages instead of a full specialization could be
justified by relaxing our technological hypotheses, for example in case of capacity
constraints, non-(piecewise) linear cost, adjustment cost varying with duration,
regulatory requirements, correlated risks of failure, etc.
13Oi (1961) proved that competitive producers benefit from price uncertainty because their
profit function is convex in  so that they are risk-lovers when the risk comes from price
variability.
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5 Imperfect competition
The objective of the section is to contrast the one market design and the two-
market design when firms have market power. Indeed, in the former section,
we have considered market mechanisms only in the case of perfect competition.
Hereafter, we assume a duopoly and, given a two-period game setting, we de-
termine the conditions for a subgame-perfect equilibrium when firms compete in
quantities. We show that, contrary to the result of Proposition 3.2, equilibrium
quantities now differ depending on the number of markets.
5.1 No day-ahead market
Suppose that there is no day-ahead market. Firms sell all their production (made
of the planned quantity chosen ex ante and the adjusted quantity chosen ex post)
on ex post state-contingent markets.
The duopoly game is as follows:
Stage 1: Firms choose their planned production  ≥ 0,  = 1 2
simultaneously and independently while demand is still random.
Stage 2: The random parameter  is revealed.
2a: The consumer’s demand function is determined and observ-
able by the two firms.
2b: Given 1 and 2 upon observing demand firms choose
their adjusted production ,  = 1 2 upwards or downwards, simultaneously and
independently.
2c: The entire production 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 is sold to meet
demand, which determines the equilibrium price and profits.
Let  ( ) represent the cost function of firm .
The profit of firm  is Π =  ( ) ( + )−  ( ) where ( ) is the
inverse demand function in state  and 1 + 1 +2 + 2 =  at demand-supply
equilibrium. We solve the model backwards.
• Ex-post
— Knowing , the representative consumer solves
max ( )−  =⇒ 
0
( )−  = 0
Then the demand function is ( ) =  0( )
— Knowing  1 and 2, producer  solves
max
( +  +− + − ) ( +)−  ( )
The first order condition is (for  = 1 2)
(++−+− )+0(++−+− ) ( +)−0 ( ) = 0
(17)
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where 0 ( ) =  ( )  and 0( ) = ()  0 since
firms do have market power.
— From conditions (17) we deduce the best response function of firm 
in state  :  = (−;  −) Combining the two best-response
functions, we obtain the Cournot adjustment outputs:
 = (−;  −)  = 1 2
and the Cournot price

³
  
´
=  0( +− +  + − )
in state , where  =  +− +  + −.
• Ex-ante, there is no demand. Firm  just launches a fraction  of its total
future supply  + 
— firm  solves
max

h

³
  
´ ¡ +  ¢−  ¡  ¢i
The FOC is
[
³
  
´ ¡
1 +  
¢
+

³
  
´

¡ +  ¢−  ¡  ¢ ] = 0 (18)
where

³
  
´
 = 
”
( +− +  + − )
¡
1 +   + −
¢
since a change in  has a direct effect not only on future contingent prices but
also on the quantities supplied by  and − in the adjustment market with indirect
consequences on future prices, and
 ¡  ¢
 = 
0
¡  ¢+ 0 ¡  ¢  
Since 0( ) ≡ ”( + − +  + − ) after injecting (17) into (18) and
simplifying we obtain
[(  ) + 0(  ) ¡ +  ¢ (1 + − )− 0 ¡  ¢] = 0 (19)
• — from conditions (19) we deduce the best response function of firm  in
stage 1:  = (−) Combining the two best-response functions,
we obtain the Cournot planned outputs:
 = (−)  = 1 2
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5.2 Day-ahead and adjustment markets
Assume now a framework made of ) a day-ahead market, followed by ) ad-
justment markets. Contrary to the former framework, at stage 1 firms sell
 = 1 + 2 on the day-ahead market at price  and at stage 2 they sell
 = 1 + 2 at price  in the adjustment market.
• Ex-post,
— knowing  1 and 2, producer  solves
max
(+  ) −  ( )
where the demand function still is (+ ) =  0(++−+− )
The first order condition is
(++−+− )+0(+−++− )−0 ( ) = 0  = 1 2
(20)
• — From conditions (17) we deduce the best response function of firm 
in state  : e = e(−;  −) Combining the two best-response
functions, we obtain the Cournot adjustment outputs:
e = e(−;  −)  = 1 2
and the Cournot price
e ³e  ´ =  0( +− + e + e− )
in state , where e =  +− + e + e−.
• Ex-ante, firm  solves
max
 (1 2) + 
he ³˜  ´ e −  ¡ e ¢i
where the ex-ante demand is  (1 2) =  ¡ 0(+  ()  )¢ with  () =e1 + e2 
• — Given the expected adjustments, the FOC is
 (1 2)+

+
⎡
⎣
e ³˜  ´
 e + e
³
˜  
´ e
 −
 ¡ e ¢

⎤
⎦ = 0
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where
e ³˜  ´
 = 
0( ) ¡1 + e  + e−¢
and
( )
 = 
0

¡ e ¢+ 0 ¡ e ¢ e .
After substituting these two derivatives, we obtain
 +

+
∙³e − 0 ¡ e ¢+ e e0´ e + e0e
µ
1 +
e−

¶
− 0
¡ e ¢¸ = 0
and finally, using (20)
  + 

 + 
∙e e0µ1 + e−
¶
− 0
¡ e ¢¸ = 0 (21)
• — From these conditions we deduce the best response function of firm 
in stage 1: e = e( e−) Combining the two best-response functions,
we obtain the Cournot planned outputs:
e = e( e−)  = 1 2
5.3 Which market design?
Given the shape of the FOCs (19) and (21), outputs are generically different
in the two market designs, contrary to what we obtained in the case of perfect
competition. To facilitate the comparison, let us rewrite the conditions in a
simplified format:
Without day-ahead market [+ 0 ¡ +  ¢ (1 + − )− 0] = 0 (22)
With day-ahead market  +  0 e +  ∙e0e µ1 + e−
¶
− 0
¸
= 0 (23)
Suppose first that there is only one firm. Clearly, in that case − ≡ 0
and the two conditions are the same if  =  []  In words, a monopoly pro-
duces the same quantity with or without a day-ahead market if there is no pos-
sibility of arbitrage by consumers. As usual, comparing the resulting condi-
tion  £ () + 0 (+  ())−  0¤ = 0 to the first-best condition given in (6),
that is  £ 0 (+  ()  )−  0¤ = 0, with or without a day-ahead market the
monopoly produces below the optimal level. In both market designs, it has an
incentive to launch its production in advance to benefit from the low costs of
planned procedure and to cost adjust ex post to maximise profit in the revealed
state of nature.
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We now switch back to the duopoly case where − is not nil. We first show
that this term is negative. Let 0(  − − ) = 0 represent the ex-post
first-order condition of firm  that is (17) or (20). Total differentiation gives
00 + 00−− = 0 where 00− = 0− and 00 = 0 By the
second-order condition of profit maximization, we have 00  0 and, from (17)
or (20), 00− = 0 + ”, which is negative for most demand functions used in
industrial organization.14 Then we obtain

− = −
00−
”
 0
and the same obviously applies to −  This term is an incentive a` la Stackelberg
to produce more than in a standard Cournot framework. As a matter of fact, by
increasing its ex ante output, firm  not only benefits from lower costs but also
pre-empts a larger future market share by pushing its competitor aside. This term
then represents an incentive to produce more. It alleviates the market power of
firms in a way similar to forward contracts in the Allaz and Vila’s model (1993).
It appears in both (22) and (23) 
However, the term 
h
0 −
i
only appears in (22)  Since it is positive, it
shifts the expected marginal revenue of firm  upward. Then expected marginal
revenue intersects expected marginal cost for a higher level of production when
there is no day-ahead market. The result is that the best response function of both
firms is shifted outwards when there is no day-ahead market. At first, we could
conclude that the day-ahead market is potentially bad for efficiency. However,
things are not that simple. First, because shifting the two best-response functions
upwards does not necessarily lead to a larger total production. If the two firms
are asymmetric, the new equilibrium can be such that one firm is closer to the
monopoly outcome leaving the other with a tiny production. Overall, the total
ex ante output may be larger when there is a day-ahead market. Second, the
final net production depends on ex post adjustment, the sign and size of which
depend on the flexibility cost. With a higher ex-ante production, one can expect
more downward and less upward adjustment. It is hard then to predict the net
result without precise specifications of the cost functions and the distribution of
probability of demand.
6 Conclusion
In most industries, there is one single efficient technology in operation at a given
date. Innovation makes the installed machines obsolete so that active firms must
adapt or die. The main reason is that products can be stored and demand is both
14As shown by Novshek (1985), it is a necessary condition for the existence of a Cournot
equilibrium.
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price-responsive and moderately volatile. Therefore the exact date of production
is not crucial. This is not true in the electricity industry where ) storage can
still accommodate only a tiny fraction of total production, ) demand is perma-
nently changing, both cyclically and randomly, and is weakly price-responsive,
and ) producers are politically and socially obliged to satisfy demand at all
dates (at least in developed countries). As a result, from the very beginning
of the electricity industry, several technologies have coexisted, some with low-
variable/high-fixed costs to meet stable demand that can be predicted at least
one day in advance, others with high-variable/low-fixed costs to meet short-term
variations in demand. Actually, all technologies embed some degree of flexibility.
They can accelerate and decelerate but at a cost higher than when they produce
steadily. The paper analyzes optimal dispatching and market outcomes for tech-
nologies that can be operated at low cost day-ahead when demand is only known
in probability, and at high cost for last-minute adjustment to observed actual
demand.
In the last twenty years or so, developed countries have liberalized the elec-
tricity industry, in particular by opening wholesale markets. The design of these
has been very similar in all countries, with a day-ahead market followed by intra-
day adjustment markets. Our paper shows that when all agents are price-takers
and risk-neutral making competition in the wholesale market efficient given de-
mand uncertainty does not necessitate a day-ahead market. By contrast, when
producers have some market power, trading only on ex-post markets or on a
combination of ex-ante and ex-post markets is not the same. Determining which
market design is more socially efficient necessitates the specification of demand,
cost and uncertainty, and the use of simulations.
References
[1] ACER and CEER (2017), ”Facilitating flexibility”, White Paper # 3 relevant
to European Commission’s Clean Energy Proposals, 22 May
[2] Allaz B. and J. L. Vila (1993), ”Cournot Competition, Forward Markets
and Efficiency”, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 59, Issue 1, February,
Pages 1-16
[3] Bertsch J., C. Growitsch, S. Lorenczik and S. Nagl (2012), ”Flexibility op-
tions in European electricity markets in high RES-E scenarios”, Institute of
Energy Economics at the University of Cologne, October.
[4] Bertsch J., C. Growitsch, S. Lorenczik and S. Nagl (2016), ”Flexibility in
Europe’s power sector – An additional requirement or an automatic com-
plement?”, Energy Economics 53, 118—131
25
[5] Bistline, J.E. (2017), ”Economic and technical challenges of flexible opera-
tions under large-scale variable renewable deployment”, Energy Economics
64, 363—372.
[6] Boiteux, M. (1949), ¿ La tarification des demandes de pointe : Application
de la the´orie de la vente au couˆt marginal À, Revue ge´ne´rale de l’e´lectricite´.
English translation ¿ Peak Load Pricing À, The Journal of Business, 1960,
33(2), 157-179.
[7] Crampes C. and T.-O. Le´autier (2012), ¿ Distributed
Load-Shedding in the Balancing of Electricity Mar-
kets À, Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy,
http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/crampes/distributed.pdf
[8] Dixit, A. (1980), ”The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence”. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 90, 95-106
[9] Eisenack K. (2015), ”Peak-load pricing with different types of dispatchabil-
ity: there can only be one”, WP, January 19, Carl von Ossietzky University
Oldenburg.
[10] Finon D. (2015), ”Le besoin de marche´s de la flexibilite´: l’adaptation du
design des marche´s e´lectriques aux productions d’e´nergies renouvelables”,
CEEM Working Paper 2015-13
[11] Goutte S. and P. Vassilopoulos (2017), ”The value of flexibility in power
markets”, Working Paper #26, Dauphine University.
[12] Ho¨schle H., C. De Jonghe, H. Le Cadre, and R. Belmans (2017), Electricity
markets for energy, flexibility and availability – Impact of capacity mech-
anisms on the remuneration of generation technologies, Energy Economics
66, 372—383.
[13] Ko¨k A.G, K. Shang and S. Yu¨cel (2016), ”Investments in Renewable and
Conventional Energy: The Role of Operational Flexibility”, Georgetown Mc-
Donough School of Business Research Paper No. 2856013, October
[14] Leland H.E. (1972) ”Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand”, Amer-
ican Economic Review 62, June, 278-291.
[15] Lykidi M. and P. Gourdel (2015), ”How to manage flexible nuclear power
plants in a deregulated electricity market from the point of view of social
welfare”, Energy, p. 1-14
[16] Ma J., V Silva, R Belhomme, D S Kirschen, L F Ochoa (2013), “Evaluating
and Planning Flexibility in Sustainable Power Systems”, IEEE Transactions
on Sustainable Energy, Vol. 4, No. 1, January, pp. 200-209
26
[17] Nicolosi M. (2010), ”Wind power integration and power system flexibility—
An empirical analysis of extreme events in Germany under the new negative
price regime”, Energy Policy, vol 38, Issue 11, November, p. 7257-7268
[18] Novshek, W., (1985), ”On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium”, Review
of Economic Studies L(II), pp. 85-98.
[19] Oi W. (1961), ”The desirability of price instability under perfect competi-
tion”, Econometrica, January, Vol. 29, 1, p. 58-64.
[20] Pescia D. (2017), ”Flexibility in thermal power plants”, Agora Energiewende,
June
[21] PJM (2017), ”Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Forma-
tion”, PJM Interconnection, November 15, http://www.pjm.com/-
/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20171115-proposed-
enhancements-to-energy-price-formation.ashx
[22] Sandmo A. (1971), ”On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price
Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, March , 61, 65-73
[23] Silva V. (2010), ”Value of flexibility in systems with large wind penetration”,
Imperial College London, October; https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-
00724358/document
7 Appendix: Proof of proposition 4.2:
In the maximization of  () for  ≥ 0, there are several cases to consider de-
pending on the relative positions of  and + compared to  and .
• Zone 1:  ≤ − .
Then () = −++ 1
2
((−)2) This expression is strictly increasing
in , so the maximum in zone 1 is achieved for  = − 
• Zone 2: −  ≤  ≤ . So + ≤ +  ≤ . Here,
 () =  ( ∈ [ +])(( − − 
2
)| ∈ [ +])
+ (  +)
∙
(− )+ 1
2
(( − )2|  +)
¸
Computations give15
(− ) () = −1
6
3+ 1
2
2(− )+(−(− )− 1
2
2− 1
2
2+ )+ 1
6
(− )3
15If  is a random variable uniformly distributed on an interval [ ], then (2) = 13(2 +
+ 2).
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(− ) 0() = −1
2
2 +(− ) +−(− )− 1
2
2 − 1
2
2 + 
The equation  0() = 0 has 2 roots 1 = −−√∆ and 2 = − +√∆,
where ∆ = 2(−)(−)  0. Notice that 1  −  2, and we have 2  
if and only if 2(− )(1− ) ≥ . There are two possible cases:
If 2( − )(1 − ) ≤ , the maximum of  in zone 2 is achieved at 2 =
− +p2(− )(− ).
If 2(− )(1− ) ≥ ,  is increasing in zone 2, and the maximum of 
in this zone is achieved at .
• Zone 3:  ≤  ≤ − .
Here, (− ) () reads:
−(−)+(−)1
6
(2+2+)+1
2
(+)+(−−)(+1
6
(2+(−)2+(−)))
Hence
(− ) 0() = −− (− ) + − 1
2
2
So we have  0()  0 if and only if   3, where
3 := − 1
2
−  (− )
We have:
3 ≥ ⇐⇒ (1−  )(− ) ≥

2

3 ≤ − ⇐⇒  (− ) ≥

2

And we have three possible cases for zone 3:
If 3 ≤ , then  is decreasing in zone 3 and the maximum of  in this
zone is achieved for  = . If 3 ≥ − , then  is increasing in zone 3 and the
maximum of  in this zone is achieved for  =  − . If  ≤ 3 ≤  − , the
maximum of  in this zone is achieved for  = 3.
• Zone 4: −  ≤  ≤ . Here,
 () =  ( ∈ [])
∙
−+ 1
2
(2| ∈ [])
¸
+ ( ∈ [ ])((−−
2
)| ∈ [ ])
Computations give:
(− ) () = −(− )− 1
6
(−)3 + 1
6
(3 − 3)
So that ( − ) 0() = −( − ) + 1
2
( − )2 and we have  0()  0 if and
only if   4, where
4 := −
p
2(− )
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4 ≥ − ⇐⇒ (− ) ≥ 
2
2

And we have two possible cases for zone 4:
If 4 ≤ − , then  is decreasing in zone 4 and the maximum of  in this
zone is achieved for  =  − . If 4 ≥  − , then the maximum of  on this
zone is achieved for  = 4.
• Zone 5:  ≤ . It is easily seen that  is decreasing on this zone, so the
maximum of  on this zone is achieved for  = .
Notice that:
(1−  )(− ) ≤

2
⇐⇒ 2 ≤ ⇐⇒ 3 ≤ 
and if (1−  )(− ) ≥ 2 , we have:

 (− ) ≥

2
⇐⇒ 3 ≤ − ⇐⇒ 4 ≤ − 
One can check that  is 1 and concave on +, and we obtain the solution
to the planification problem as announced in proposition 4.2.
Fix finally ,  and the mean  = 1
2
(+ ), and write  = − .
In zone ,
 ∗
 =
√
2(− )32
3
√ −
(− )
2
+

12
+
2
2

This function is mimimized at  = 2(− ), and ∗ (2(− )) = 22  0.
In zone ,
 ∗
 =
2
2 −

2
+

12
+
3
242 
This function is mimimized at  = , and ∗ () = 2( − 12)2 ≥ 0.
Finally, in zone ,
 ∗
 = −

2
+

12
+
√
232
3
√ 
This function is mimimized at  = 2, and ∗ (2) = 0. This concludes the
proof of proposition 4.2.
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